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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
 No. 11-1790 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v.  
 
KEBRUM TEKLU, 
                       Appellant 
_______________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 D.C. Criminal No. 2-09-cr-00060-005 
 (Honorable Berle M. Schiller) 
______________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 November 16 2012 
 
 Before:  SCIRICA, FISHER, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Filed:  February 7, 2013) 
 
_________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
Kebrum Teklu appeals his judgment of conviction and sentence arising from a 
conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)).  Teklu contends the 
government breached its plea agreement by failing to fulfill a purported oral promise.  
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We will affirm. 
I. 
 In October 2008, Teklu was indicted on seven counts arising from a string of 
armed robberies in the Philadelphia region:  one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs 
Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)) (Count 1); three counts of Hobbs Act robbery  
(18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)) (Counts 4, 14, and 16); and three counts of carrying a firearm 
during a violent crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)) (Counts 5, 15, and 17).  Teklu was 
unemployed when the robberies were committed, but had previously worked at Delancey 
Street Bagels—one of the targeted businesses. 
  Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Teklu pled guilty to all of the charges 
against him except one gun charge—Count 17.  In exchange for his guilty plea, the 
government agreed to move to dismiss the remaining gun charge at Teklu’s sentencing if 
he cooperated in the prosecution of his coconspirators.  An integration clause limited the 
terms of Teklu’s plea to those in the written agreement.  The integration clause also 
required that subsequent promises be embodied in a writing signed by both parties in 
order to be considered part of Teklu’s plea agreement.  At his change of plea hearing, 
Teklu confirmed the terms of the written plea agreement. 
 Teklu then testified against Devon Brinkley, one of his coconspirators.  However, 
during the Brinkley trial, the government misstated the terms of Teklu’s plea agreement.  
Instead of explaining that it had promised to drop one gun charge (Count 17) in exchange 
for Teklu’s testimony, the government incorrectly stated that it had promised to drop two 
gun charges in exchange for Teklu’s testimony:   
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Q:  And pursuant to th[e written plea] agreement is it true that at the time of 
sentencing the Government may decide to drop two of the gun charges that 
are currently pending against you? 
A:  Yes. 
 
By agreeing with the government’s misstatement, Teklu’s testimony at the Brinkley trial 
contradicts his earlier acknowledgment that the government would drop only one gun 
charge in exchange for his cooperation. 
Despite his testimony against Brinkley, the government did not move to dismiss 
Count 17—let alone two gun charges—at Teklu’s sentencing.  Teklu failed to object to 
this apparent breach of the plea agreement.  The district court imposed a sentence of 180 
months’ imprisonment on Counts 1, 4, 5, 14, 15, and 16, but significantly did not impose 
a sentence on Count 17. 
II. 
 The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Given Teklu’s failure to object at sentencing, we review for 
plain error.  United States v. Dahmen, 675 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Puckett v. 
United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)), abrogating United States v. Rivera, 357 F.3d 
290 (3d Cir. 2004).   
In order to prevail on plain error review, a defendant must show:  (1) there was an 
error or defect below (i.e., “some sort of ‘[d]eviation from a legal rule’”) that was not 
“intentionally relinquished or abandoned”; (2) the error is “clear or obvious, rather than 
subject to reasonable dispute”; and (3) the error “‘affected the outcome of the district 
court proceedings.’”  Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (alteration in original) (quoting United 
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States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993)).  If these three requirements are met, we 
have discretion to remedy the error if it “‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings.’”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Olano, 
507 U.S. at 736). 
 With respect to the first step of the plain error analysis, we must determine 
whether the government breached the plea agreement.  Here, we look to contract-law 
standards to determine whether the government’s conduct was inconsistent with the 
defendant’s reasonable understanding of the agreement when he pled guilty.  United 
States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 939 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Santobello v. New York, 
404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)). 
III. 
 On appeal, Teklu contends the government breached the plea agreement by failing 
to drop two gun charges.1
The government argues that Teklu’s plea agreement is limited to the terms of the 
written plea agreement executed prior to the Brinkley trial.  In addition, the government 
argues that its failure to move to dismiss Count 17 does not constitute a breach of the 
  This contention rests on two assumptions.  First, it assumes the 
plea agreement is not limited to the terms of the written plea agreement, but includes the 
government’s misstatement at the Brinkley trial.  Second, it assumes this misstatement 
constitutes a binding oral promise by the government to drop two gun charges in 
exchange for Teklu’s testimony against Brinkley.   
                                                 
1 Nowhere does Teklu contend the government breached the plea agreement solely by 
failing to move to dismiss Count 17. 
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written plea agreement because the court did not impose a sentence on this count.2
IV. 
  In 
other words, Teklu received the benefit of the plea agreement. 
Arguably, the government breached the terms of the written plea agreement by 
failing to move to dismiss Count 17 at Teklu’s sentencing, but this does not constitute 
plain error because it did not affect the outcome of the proceedings.  
Even if the government’s misstatement at the Brinkley trial could be interpreted as 
a promise to drop two gun charges, Teklu could not reasonably have understood this 
purported oral promise to be part of his plea agreement because it did not conform to the 
integration clause in the written plea agreement (i.e., it was not embodied in a writing 
signed by both parties).  Thus, the government could not have breached the plea 
agreement by failing to drop two gun charges.  See United States v. Ramos, 971 F. Supp. 
199, 208-09 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (concluding that a written plea agreement’s integration 
clause precluded a theory of breach based on a broken oral promise); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213 cmt. c (1981) (“Where the parties have adopted 
a writing as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement, even 
consistent additional terms are superseded.”).   
The government acknowledges that Teklu cooperated in the prosecution of his 
coconspirators.  It does not explain why it failed to move to dismiss Count 17 at 
sentencing.  See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262 (stating that when a prosecutor makes a 
                                                 
2 The government does not explain why it failed to move to dismiss Count 17 at Teklu’s 
sentencing. 
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promise in a plea agreement, he must keep it); United States v. Miller, 565 F.2d 1273, 
1274 (3d Cir. 1977) (“[T]he Government must adhere strictly to the terms of the bargains 
it strikes with defendants.”).  Nevertheless, this apparent breach does not constitute plain 
error because it did not “affect[] the outcome of the district court proceedings” since no 
sentence was imposed on Count 17.  Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Consequently, there is no need to consider whether the error 
“seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  
Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence. 
